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Abstract
Background: This paper presents findings from a study which sought to understand why health workers working 
under the results-based financing (RBF) arrangements in Zimbabwe reported being satisfied with the improvements 
in working conditions and compensation, but paradoxically reported lower motivation levels compared to those not 
working under RBF arrangements. 
Methods: A qualitative study was conducted amongst health workers and managers working in health facilities that 
were implementing the RBF arrangements and those that were not. Through purposeful sampling, 4 facilities in RBF 
implementing districts that reported poor motivation and satisfaction, were included as study sites. Four facilities located 
in non-RBF districts which reported high motivation and satisfaction were also included. Data was collected through 
in-depth interviews and analyzed using the framework approach. 
Results: Results based financing arrangements introduce a wide range of new institutional arrangements, roles, tasks, 
and ways of doing things, for facility staff, facility managers and, district and provincial health management teams. 
Findings reveal that insufficient preparedness of people and processes for this change, constrained managers and workers 
performance. Results based financing arrangements introduce explicit and tacit changes, including but not limited to, 
incentive logics, in the system. Findings show that unless systematic efforts are made to enable the absorption of these 
changes in the system: eg, through reconfiguring the decision space available at various levels, through clarification 
of accountability relationships, through building personnel and process capacities, before instituting changes, the full 
potential of the RBF arrangements cannot be realised. 
Conclusion:  Our study demonstrates the importance of analysing existing institutional, management and governance 
arrangements and capabilities and taking these into account when designing and implementing RBF interventions. 
Introducing RBF arrangements cannot alone overcome chronic systemic weaknesses. For a system wide change, as RBF 
arguably is, to be effected, explicit organisational change management processes need to be put in place, across the system. 
Carefully designed processes, which take into account the interest and willingness of various actors to change, and which 
are cognizant of and constructively engage with potential bottlenecks and points of resistance, should accompany any 
health system change initiative. 
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Background
Several low- and middle-income countries are turning to 
results-based financing (RBF) arrangements as a means to 
achieve their universal health coverage related ambitions. 
Others, some of the early adopters of the RBF arrangements, 
are in the process of scaling up. The literature reveals a 
vibrant debate between proponents and doubters of the 
RBF approach. Interestingly, this debate is not restricted 
to academia, but has wide participation of policy-makers, 
practitioners, and researchers. The questions under debate 
are wide ranging; for example: some scholars are unpacking 
the origins and political economy leanings of RBF,1 some are 
critically examining the key assumptions underpinning RBF,2 
and others are examining operational and implementation 
challenges to inform policy and to improve practice.3-6 
This study adds to this growing body of empirical 
examination of the key assumptions underpinning RBF; 
it does so in light of the operational and implementation 
ground realities. A recent survey by Nguyen et al,7 done as 
part of an impact evaluation of the RBF reform in Zimbabwe, 
found lower levels of motivation amongst health workers 
working under RBF arrangements. We present the results of 
a qualitative study that sought to explain these findings. The 
insights gained from this study will be useful beyond the study 
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Implications for policy makers
• Introduction of Results-Based Financing (RBF) arrangements should be recognised as a system wide reform and change process.
• Policy-makers in low- and middle-income country contexts should allow the introduction of complex wide reforms only when they are assured 
of the capacity of their health systems to effectively absorb the many complex changes that are usually entailed in such processes. 
• Leadership and teamwork are crucial determinants for health worker motivation, including within RBF arrangements. Successful RBF 
implementation requires that conditions are met to improve leadership and management at local facility level. For example, through: 
decentralisation of decision-making; clarity about roles and responsibilities; better support to local level managers in staff and stakeholder 
management.
• If RBF arrangements are being introduced, it is critical to recognise that they insert complex relational dynamics within the health system. These 
should be thoroughly studied during a trial implementation phase, and on an ongoing basis. Doing so will allow: adapting the RBF intervention 
to the context and a measured judgment about the feasibility of further scale up. 
• For effective implementation of RBF arrangements, explicit organisational change management processes need to be put in place, across the 
health system.
Implications for the public
Paying health workers based on performance is easier said than done. Zimbabwe’s experience shows that pay for performance schemes in the public 
health services can be effective, but also confirms the importance of taking into account the current system and capacities before initiating any 
changes. The case of Zimbabwe highlights that introduction of any such scheme requires careful reflection and diligent preparation, especially to 
enable local level managers to effectively play their role as leaders and supporting staff to work in teams.  Findings show that not doing so is likely to 
negatively impact on health worker motivation. 
Key Messages 
settings; they can help both, countries that are contemplating 
the introduction of RBF, and those in the process of scaling 
up. 
Zimbabwe, with support from the World Bank, initiated a 
reform process which introduced RBF for health arrangements 
in 2011. While RBF entails some changes across the 6 building 
blocks of the health system, it primarily works through 
targeting financing, leadership and governance and some 
human resource processes in the health system. In contrast to 
the traditional input-based financing, RBF is an output-based 
financing arrangement in which a principal entity purchases 
services from a recipient conditional to quality and after 
verification of declared results.8,9 Within RBF arrangements, 
health workers individually, and collectively as a facility, 
are rewarded based on their performance measured against 
pre-agreed targets. Facilities are given the autonomy to use 
the facility level rewards to fund improvements in service 
delivery. The intervention logic of RBF arrangements is that a 
combination of monetary rewards based on results, together 
with the autonomy to use these funds, leads to health facilities 
improving their working conditions, and health workers being 
motivated to perform and to deliver quality care (see p24).10 
RBF arrangements are not meant to replace existing systems, 
but rather to facilitate and/or enforce policies/processes that 
are identified as being not well functioning. For example, in 
the context of Zimbabwe, through inclusion as conditions 
in the contracts, RBF seeks to ensure that each contracted 
facility has a functional health centre committee (HCC), and 
that facilities do not charge any fees for services; similarly, it 
seeks to encourage the conduct of supervision visits. 
There have been notable improvements in the coverage 
and quality of services since the introduction of RBF 
arrangements in parts of Zimbabwe; these are detailed in an 
evaluation conducted by the World Bank in 2016.11 However, 
insights from the survey done by Nguyen et al7 revealed that 
while those health workers under the RBF arrangements were 
satisfied with the improvements in working conditions and 
compensation, their motivation levels were lower. Nguyen and 
colleagues’7 study measured and compared satisfaction and 
motivation amongst frontline health workers working in RBF 
intervention areas, and those not. Survey measurements were 
conducted at baseline, before the RBF intervention began, and 
again after 30 months. Motivation was studied as an aggregate 
of 8 constructs, namely: teamwork, autonomy, recognition, 
self-concept, change in facility, work environment, leadership 
of facilities, and well-being. While motivation levels fell across 
all 8 constructs, the poorest outcomes were for leadership of 
facilities, teamwork, and well-being This fall in the motivation 
of frontline health workers, occurring with 30 months of 
initiation of the RBF intervention, was a matter of concern; it 
was also contrary to the RBF intervention logic. Nguyen and 
colleagues7 study showed that not only did the motivation 
among those working under RBF fall, it was significantly 
lower than in the non-RBF areas. Thus, the question that this 
study sought to answer was ‘Why did health workers working 
under RBF arrangements report lower levels of motivation 
despite being satisfied with the working conditions and 
receiving better compensation?’ The objective of this study 
was therefore to gain insight into the reasons behind this fall 
in motivation, and to use this insight to inform policy and 
practice. 
These findings about health workers experience of RBF 
arrangements are however to some extent in line with what 
has been recently reported from Zambia by Shen et al.12 More 
broadly, Asiri et al13 in their recent review of research on factors 
influencing motivation and performance of health workers, 
argue that managers’ ability to provide support, facilitate team 
work, manage conflicts and negotiate with their superiors and 
other stakeholders, shapes the motivation and performance 
of the staff they manage. Asiri et al13 add that managers do 
not function in a vacuum – that the manager’s ability to act 
depends, among others, on their leadership and management 
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competencies, decision-making space and tools and support 
they themselves have access to. In this paper, we draw on 
this literature to show that for the RBF premise to hold, ie, 
for frontline health workers to be able to exercise autonomy 
and work together to achieve results, requires that conditions 
are created, and health facility managers are supported and 
enabled, to exercise leadership to motivate their teams to 
work together. We critically examine the RBF intervention 
in Zimbabwe to expose the key factors that influenced health 
facility manager’s ability (or not) to exercise leadership, 
improve teamwork to improve their facility’s performance. 
Methods 
Study Design 
A qualitative exploratory study was conducted between 
June 2015 and October 2015 to explore factors influencing 
health facility managers’ ability to exercise leadership and 
to improve teamwork-the main determinants responsible 
for the decline in motivation. The performance-based 
financing framework of the Health Results Innovations 
Trust Fund (HRITF) was chosen as the Apriori conceptual 
framework to guide the inquiry.14 This framework was 
chosen because it comprehensively articulates the potential 
contextual factors that could influence the implementation 
of RBF interventions. It was also chosen because it is used 
in Zimbabwe to guide inquiries and analyses geared towards 
identifying areas for learning about and improving RBF 
design and implementation. According to the framework, a 
variety of factors, operating across several contextual levels, 
influence RBF interventions: intervention context, health 
system context, health facility context, geographic context, 
community context, and the political context. Adopting these 
categories of contextual factors to guide our inquiry allowed 
us to take a broad and comprehensive view in the questions 
we asked – such an approach was particularly appropriate for 
the exploratory nature of the inquiry. 
Sampling
Sampling was purposeful. Four facilities located in RBF-
districts that had reported poor motivation and satisfaction 
during the impact evaluation, with results ranging from 
67%-80% of facility staff being demotivated, were included 
as study sites. We included 4 facilities located in non-RBF 
districts which reported high motivation and satisfaction 
so as to identify if similar factors influenced leadership and 
teamwork in these settings. These were included to enrich our 
data and to improve sense-making through comparing and 
contrasting across the 2 settings. Cadres to be interviewed 
were purposively selected with the aim of including all 
types of cadres affected by the RBF arrangement in the 
facility; members of the Provincial Health Executive (PHE) 
and District Health Executive (DHE) were also included 
as key informants with a view to gain insight into broader 
contextual influences. Table shows the respondents who were 
interviewed; details of the study districts and sites where the 
respondents hailed from, have been withheld to maintain 
confidentiality. Further details of the context of the districts 
where the study was conducted can be found in Nguyen et al7 
and in the evaluation conducted by the World Bank.10,14
Data Collection and Analysis
Topic guides were developed to conduct in-depth interviews 
with managers/supervisors at district and provincial levels, 
and with managers (nurse in charge) and health workers at 
facility level. These topic guides were refined, and probes were 
added to include emerging themes as the data collection (and 
simultaneous preliminary analysis) proceeded. All interviews 
were carried out by 2 members of the research team (CG, 
IM); all interviews were conducted in English, were recorded 
using voice recorders, and audio files were transcribed 
verbatim. Data were collected over a 2-week period from 19 
to 31 October 2015. The processes of analysis of data began 
in tandem with data collection; at the end of each day of data 
collection the researchers debriefed and shared field notes, 
to note the emerging analytical themes. Once data collection 
was completed, and audio files transcribed, a framework 
approach15 was used to analyse the transcripts. This meant 
that the research team analysed data through a process of 
reading, re-reading and discussing, followed by charting 
and sorting of key issues and themes that emerged from the 
data. This was an iterative, deliberative process that involved 
holding the findings and their context against theory, to 
proffer explanations. 
Transcripts were coded by 2 researchers independently in 
NVivo software (v 11); they were coded to nodes derived from 
the inquiry framework, and from the themes that emerged 
during data collection and analysis. Triangulation of findings 
across facilities, participant categories, and data collection 
methods allowed a thorough understanding of experiences, 
and of the factors shaping these, to emerge. 
Results
This section presents key findings about what all influenced 
the facility manager’s ability to effectively lead their staff 
and to motivate them to work together to achieve results. 
Findings in the form of specific themes are organised under 
the broad lines of the various contexts articulated in the 
HRITF framework14: health system context, health facility 










Nurse aid 2 4
Primary counsellors 1 2
General hand 2 3
Total 49
Abbreviations: RBF, results-based financing; PHE, provincial health 
executive; DHE, district health executive; RGN, registered general nurse; 
PCN, primary care nurse; EHT, environmental health technician.
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community characteristics and geography. 
However, the headings in this section do not map exactly to 
the HRITF framework categories. They instead reflect what 
emerged from the interviews as being important; for instance, 
the health system and health facility contextual domains 
elicited the most responses and insights from the respondents. 
For example, the community domain elicited some insights; 
however, these overlapped with the political-economy 
domain, but only with the local politics and not the broader 
political-economy as articulated in HRITF framework. 
Similarly, while in the HRITF framework, geography is 
subsumed in the community context – our findings reveal that 
geographical considerations shape health workers experience 
in multiple ways, linking across community, health systems, 
and health facility contexts. Hence, geography is presented 
as a separate heading in this section. The structure of the 
findings section thus reflects what we found and how much 
of it. This divergence from how things are imagined in 
the HRITF framework is understandable given that study 
respondents were facility level frontline staff and frontline 
managers who are more likely to relate their experiences to 
the immediate facility-system-community contexts, and not 
to the broader political-economy context. Findings illustrate 
that the local and more mundane implementation dynamics 
are as important as the larger contextual influences, perhaps 
even more important, to comprehensively understand the 
implementation processes around RBF. 
Health System Context 
The facility manager’s ability to effectively lead their staff, to 
motivate them to work together to achieve results, irrespective 
of the broader incentive arrangements (results based or 
unlinked), was to a large extent explained by existing health 
system management arrangements which were either yet to 
be addressed by or were beyond the ambit of influence of the 
RBF arrangements. 
Weaknesses in Managing Change: Deployment of Registered 
General Nurses as Facility In-Charge 
The lack of a systematic process for managing change in the 
management arrangements in RBF facilities, specifically the 
deployment of newly qualified and relatively inexperienced 
registered general nurses (RGNs) as facility in-charge, has led 
to friction amongst, and demotivation of facility level staff. 
According to policy it is the RGN who is in-charge by virtue 
of holding higher qualifications. But entrenched informal 
professional hierarchies in the health system, seriously 
constrained the ability of in-charges of health facilities, to lead 
their teams well. For instance, a common issue pertained to 
RGNs being appointed as nurse in-charge (NIC); this involved 
them superseding existing cadres. RGNs were often younger 
and less experienced than the other staff they oversaw in their 
capacity as NIC. This, perhaps inevitably, created a difficult 
environment for RGNs in both RBF and non-RBF facilities. 
This, however, played out stronger in RBF-facilities where 
they were required to exercise leadership and foster teamwork 
for the facility targets to be achieved. It further came to the 
fore when the often younger and less experience RGNs also 
did not have a good understanding of service delivery and/
or RBF arrangements. When RGNs were deployed to primary 
care facilities, other established facility staff struggled to 
accept them as the new boss. At some facilities the primary 
care nurses (PCNs) who were in-charge prior to the arrival of 
the RGN, and had years of experience, refused to cooperate 
in orienting the new boss. That many PCNs felt that now 
they were being considered not good enough to do what 
they had always done, further complicated matters; as the 
following quotes illustrate, the system fell woefully short in 
managing this major change in facility level management 
arrangements. 
“There was a time whereby we felt we are under estimated 
by this other cadre of ours (by RGNs and others). I do almost 
the same duties despite the fact they have higher training. 
This was mostly in 2013 and 2014 … we almost felt like 
leaving” [PCN].
“In 2012 I was selected to be focal person of TB programme. 
After I came from upskilling I was told an RGN should be the 
focal person. Such things make us feel that we are made to 
work when it is convenient for them but when RGNs come 
we are moved” [PCN]. 
This was also the case for the district medical officers 
(DMOs) who were also members of the DHE. For instance, 
most DMOs in the selected districts were young (3 of the 4 
were just about 30 years old); they had limited public health 
and leadership experience. As the following quote illustrates, 
at some places, DHE members were not trained in RBF 
and yet they were supposed to advise and guide the health 
facilities. The poor support from higher management in 
preparing facility managers to deal with change in general and 
in particular to support various cadres to cope with and work 
within the new RBF arrangements was a source of frustration 
and a demotivator for many health workers.
“Training for nurses, doctors or EHTs [environmental 
health technicians] has no management aspects. Maybe that 
is one thing that needs to be included in the curriculum. 
For me my seniors are the ones who have been guiding me 
through it. Everyone learns on the job there is no training 
organised to help you cope on the job. Even doctors need 
management training because in the last 3 years it has not 
happened” [DMO].
DHEs have the mandate to oversee all health facility 
teams, including to effect changes in the facility leadership as 
appropriate. DHEs are also required to actively manage the 
change process to ensure that transitions do not negatively 
impact service delivery. However, the above instance signals 
that these change management process did not go well, at both 
DHE and facility levels. DMOs across both RBF and non-RBF 
contexts had limited public health and leadership experience 
and capacity. However, the challenge of implementing a 
reform as complex as RBF meant that the DMOs in the RBF 
districts had greater difficulties in supporting the facilities 
they oversaw. 
Lack of Clarity on Roles and Lines of Reporting 
Lack of clarity about roles, responsibilities, and lines of 
reporting, either because of ambiguities in RBF related 
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institutional arrangements, due to poor direction from higher-
ups, or sometimes the result of how these were interpreted 
and applied at the local level, led to tensions in inter-cadre 
and interpersonal relations. It affected the ability of facility 
managers to exercise leadership and to foster teamwork. 
This problem was systemic and played out in both RBF and 
non-RBF settings. For instance, as the following excerpts 
from interviews with an RGN, a PCN and a PHE show, there 
were ambiguities in even the most routine and in some ways 
mundane matters like the overseeing of duty rosters; these 
were enough to trigger resentment and to surface broader 
underlying inter-cadre animosities. 
“They had clashes on roles and responsibilities. The doctor 
was planning daily duties and allocating duties for nurses 
instead of the NIC. Two people were causing confusion to the 
members of staff. Factions were created as a result. The nurse 
aides, general hands and other nurses were on the side of the 
doctor and the other staff on the side of the NIC” [RGN].
Similarly, while provincial and district managers are clear 
regarding roles of and relationship between the EHT and 
NIC in health facilities, other institutional arrangements were 
such that they left room for friction, no matter the broader 
incentive arrangements. EHTs reported to parallel structures 
while the head of facility was the NIC. The problem came to 
the fore when RBF arrangements came into force; meetings 
had to be held and the challenge was who should chair the 
meetings. At facility level, in most cases, because there was no 
clarity on these matters, it led to tensions between nurses and 
EHTs with regard to who was really in charge. The EHTs tend 
to be older, often male, and on the job for longer, whereas 
the RGNs tended to be women, younger and newer. In some 
facilities the EHT refused to take instructions from the RGN/
NIC; this was particularly problematic when the NIC was a 
PCN and thus less qualified than the EHT. Communication 
between EHTs and nurses was poor to the extent that an 
EHT would go for field visits without informing the NIC. In 
such cases the NIC would mark the EHT as absent from duty 
resulting in EHTs losing out on RBF incentives, as illustrated 
by this quote from a PCN: 
“For example, an EHT at a clinic went for study leave 
without communicating with the NIC at his clinic but the 
district knew he had gone for study leave. When the RBF 
funds came he also wanted the incentives, but the staff 
refused since he was on study leave. He complained to the 
district about the issue and this was addressed by the DHE. It 
was resolved that he be paid the number of days he worked at 
the facility and should also strengthen communication with 
his colleagues. This was last year 2014. These challenges have 
been in existence for long but now they are exposed because 
of RBF which requires team effort” [PCN].
We found that these ambiguities in lines of reporting and 
accountability at the facility level, particularly concerning 
the NIC and the EHT, were problematic. These ambiguities 
were a constant source of discord and demotivation amongst 
facility level health workers. Our findings show that these 
problems are systemic, and they cut across RBF and non-
RBF districts; however, we found that this lack of clarity was 
particularly acute in RBF districts. This appeared to be due 
to design issues in the RBF institutional arrangements, or 
to poor direction from higher-ups, or sometimes the result 
of how these were interpreted and applied at the local level. 
As the following quote shows, this was further complicated 
by the fact that often the district and provincial managers 
approached these problematic institutional and relational 
arrangements as being merely interpersonal problems, and as 
something that had to be and could be managed as such.
“The EHTs work is not centered on the clinics. He has to 
go out and collect the samples and come back. But the nurses 
are always at the clinic. They need to work together as a team 
complaining is not warranted” [PHE].
DHE Capacity to Coach and Mentor, Supports or Hampers 
Health Facility Performance
Findings revealed that health facility staff at an RBF site 
found supportive supervision as being helpful; they find 
being mentored, guided, motivated and assisted in conflict 
resolution and problem solving, very important. As the 
following excerpt from an interview with a DMO illustrates, 
this is an aspect of the system that has improved substantially 
since the institution of RBF arrangements. 
“DHE is getting funds from RBF for fuel and servicing of 
cars, now we are able to conduct supervision more regularly 
and verifying data. Whatever gaps were there before they are 
becoming more noticeable. There has also been an increase 
in the programmes that have been going to the clinics eg, 
decentralisation of antiretroviral therapy … which we cannot 
attribute to RBF. RBF has given us an opportunity to look at 
the gaps at the health facility. So even if RBF is finished we 
should continue the monitoring” [DMO].
However, local and individual level weaknesses in the 
implementation of what appear otherwise to be robust 
institutional arrangements (eg, related to supervision), 
continue to undermine staff motivation, irrespective of 
the broader incentive framework. For instance, and not 
unexpectedly, in both RBF and non-RBF sites, whenever 
DHE’s supportive supervision was focused on fault finding 
and lacking confidentiality, as the following quote from a PCN 
illustrates, it discouraged those who were thus supervised. 
“At times lack of praise by the DHE affects our performance. 
At times the DHE comments using discouraging words. If 
you are praised, you become happy” [PCN].
A DMO candidly accepted that ‘Or maybe it’s because on 
some occasions we shout at them for poor performance but it’s 
not so many times.’ She and others added that given the multiple 
responsibilities they had, and the additional responsibilities 
they now had under the RBF arrangements, meant that 
there was much pressure on their time – preventing them to 
perform their jobs optimally.
Temptation for Higher-Ups to Override Local Resource 
Allocation Decisions 
The RBF arrangements explicitly seek to increase autonomy 
at facility level, and health facility staff (including and 
together with facility managers in lead) are expected to set 
their own priorities, including in matters pertaining to 
allocation of resources. However, facility level managers and 
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staff feel that there is too much interference from the district 
and the province levels, and that this undermines their ability 
to achieve their targets. On the other hand, as the following 
quote clearly shows, some managers at district and provincial 
level felt that they had the right to intervene – to ensure that 
lower level facilities were operating within guidelines, and not 
abusing their autonomy.
“We once had a provincial visit to the clinic and they 
concluded that the clinics should not be given absolute 
autonomy because they can abuse funds e.g. buying expensive 
items and giving each other allowances” [DMO].
These competing interests, and the ability of higher-ups 
(PHE/DHE) to override local resource allocation decisions 
undermined the ability of facility level managers to exercise 
their leadership and to foster teamwork, particularly in RBF 
facilities. In non-RBF facilities with the traditional input-
based financing and no rewards to be had for achieving target, 
this was not an issue as the facility level managers expected 
higher ups to intervene, and there was no price to be paid for 
any decisions that were contravened by higher ups.
Administrative Constraints Undermine Gains Made Through 
Structural Changes (Changes Like RBF)
Administrative processes which are beyond the control of the 
facility manager, eg, delays in the receipt of incentive monies 
from the fund holder, hinder the facility manager’s ability to 
credibly lead her team and to foster teamwork. It also delays 
the execution of jointly agreed plans and translates into loss 
of potential financial gains for staff – thus, as the quotes below 
illustrates, frustrating and demotivating the staff. 
“Our plan was to electrify the clinic but the money we 
received was too late and too little, so we sacrificed even our 
incentives for electrification so that we attract mothers to 
come and deliver here” [GH].
Facility level managers and staff reported this as a major 
concern; they pointed out that delays in disbursements were a 
regular problem; and that the processes to collect the incentive 
monies were tedious and that requests (forms) were returned 
for trivial mistakes. All this undermined the ability of facility 
managers to lead and motivate their staff to work as a team to 
achieve results.
System Wide Staffing Shortages 
While RBF arrangements have goaded and motivated 
health workers to improve access to services, the system 
wide shortfall in capacity (both infrastructure and human 
resource) has meant that this expansion of access is perhaps 
occurring at the expense of quality of care. Staff deployment 
to some facilities has not been consistent with the catchment 
population. For example, a facility in a non-RBF district had 
3 nurses for a population of about 3000, yet another facility 
in an RBF district had only 2 nurses serving a population of 
over 6000. Similarly, many facilities experienced a double 
burden of staff shortages and high work load due to the 
many programmes that had been decentralised from higher 
levels of care in an effort to offer comprehensive primary care 
services. These human and material constraints undermined 
the quality of care. 
Our findings signpost that RBF related changes, if 
implemented without concomitant appropriate human 
resource redeployments and reforms by the ministry of 
health, can undermine the ability of health facility teams to 
fulfil their responsibilities. For example, increased demand 
for services can create situations where there is mismatch 
between the population being served and the workload – 
leading to, as the quote below highlights, frustration, and low 
motivation.
“We do not assess the patients properly ... which is 
frustrating because we may misdiagnose ...” [RGN].
Health Facility and Individual Context
While the above health system level issues affect the ability 
of facility level managers to effectively lead their staff, and to 
motivate them to work together to achieve results, the study 
found some local facility context level factors that could also 
independently influence the manager’s abilities. 
Incentives as Rallying Points for Teamwork
In the RBF districts, teamwork was uniquely fostered by the 
clear and shared benefits of working as a team to achieve 
targets and to earn higher incentives. However, in the non-
RBF sites there was no such rallying point that would foster 
teamwork; here teamwork was not seen as being important 
as health facilities received a fixed compensation. One PCN 
at one facility in a non-RBF district pointed that the ubiquity 
of delays in the submission of documentation to the district 
(to submit regular reports all staff would need to work 
together to complete it), in some ways best symbolised the 
poor state of teamwork in her context. In contrast, under 
RBF arrangements, given the collective expectation of having 
additional financial resources, for their facilities and for 
themselves alike, staff have become more organized and work 
together to improve documentation (reporting is one of the 
results within the RBF program). 
Individual Manager’s Capacity and Preparedness to Fulfil 
Management Functions
In both, RBF and non-RBF facilities, health workers reported 
problems with the facility leadership, and sometimes district 
level leadership, as being a key demotivator. Although not 
specifically mentioned, the importance of good leadership 
capacities and capacities to stimulate teamwork are at the heart 
of good management practice; and the lack of this is likely to 
have had a stronger impact on the RBF facilities, given the 
shift from centralized decision making to local level decision 
making regarding the allocation and use of funds. Similarly, 
leadership is key to ensuring collaboration within teams, 
and to enable smooth interactions with other stakeholders. 
Leadership related problems that the staff referred to were 
often related to individual managers, and their capacities. For 
instance, many facility staff highlighted issues of favouritism 
in the selection of staff to attend trainings; this was an 
important source of discontent and demotivation amongst 
many health workers. Besides the learning, and the time 
off from work, staff viewed the trainings as an opportunity 
to earn some extra income, given the allowances that went 
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with the trainings. Some members of staff, as the following 
quotes illustrates, did not get a chance to attend workshops, 
and hence felt that they were being unfairly treated, and thus 
felt demotivated. 
 “The malaria case management workshop is a workshop 
that should also include EHTs as well and the coordination 
is also supposed to be done at the DHE level, but we are not 
invited. We need to get new knowledge and be innovative, 
things are changing, and how do you expect us to know new 
knowledge when we are not attending workshops” [EHT].
While facility staff also reported other problems with 
their managers eg, allocation of tasks, sanctioning of leave 
days etc, the example of inability of some managers to 
manage training opportunities fairly, signals a lack of formal 
accountability structures and appropriate checks and balances 
and insufficient preparation of those assigned to be facility 
managers, to take on these management responsibilities. 
Many young RGNs and DMOs pointed out that they were 
only trained clinicians, and that they had had little training 
or guidance on management, let alone on the complexities of 
management of human resource and financial processes. 
Local Context: Local Politics, Community Characteristics 
and Geography 
The Influence of Local Politics 
The RBF arrangements seek to revive the HCCs with a view to 
encourage community ownership of services and community 
mobilisation for improving utilisation. This implies that the 
functioning of the HCC had an influence on the performance 
of the facilities, and at the same time required facility managers 
to communicate and establish good relationships with the 
HCC. In contrast, in the traditional input–based financing 
arrangements, this was neither required, nor relevant. 
Previous evaluations have shown that most of the high 
performing RBF facilities had well-functioning HCCs that 
met regularly.10 They jointly identified issues and prioritised 
activities for improvement of facilities and services and worked 
closely with facility staff to address these issues. The well-
functioning HCCs also took interest in the performance data 
of their facility, often comparing it with that of other clinics, 
and learning from the better performing facilities. 
However, wherever there were poorly functioning HCCs, 
irrespective of the reasons, it undermined the ability of 
the facility management to take timely decisions. This 
indecisiveness undetermined the achievement of agreed 
results, and translated into loss of incentive related earnings at 
facility level and at the individual level; this frustrated the staff 
and undermined their motivation to perform. The reasons for 
poor functioning of HCCs were almost always rooted in the 
local social and political context. The latter, the local politics 
was cited by health facility staff and managers as being a big 
problem. Problems included: (1) Elite capture of the HCC; (2) 
Domination of HCCs by members who were not constructive 
and not interested in working towards a common goal, but 
more interested in exercising power over the facility staff; 
(3) Local community members and HCC members, being 
envious and resentful of the monies/incentives being earned 
by facility staff; (4) Political/ideological differences between 
some of the health facility staff and HCC members. Poorly 
functioning HCCs could paralyse facility operations in 
many ways; for example, rules require a quorum to approve 
expenses at the health centre – as the following quote from an 
NIC illustrates, a matter as simple as low attendance of HCC 
meetings meant that funds for routine expenses would not be 
released.
“The HCC has 13 members but as you can see from the 
minutes of the past 6 months the members present are always 
less than 5. This is the problem” [NIC].
Differences in Community Contexts Impacting RBF Achievements
Local level burden of disease patterns and health seeking 
patterns did not often sufficiently align with what was included 
in the RBF targets. This related to: (1) The type of diseases that 
were included in the targets; (2) The environmental conditions 
which often determined the major burden of disease in certain 
areas (eg, occurrence of snakebites and rabies in one area); (3) 
The expected occurrence due to seasonality of diseases (eg, 
malaria and diarrhoea); (4) The local customs around care 
seeking (eg, the custom that the first delivery should be at 
the wife’s family home, leading to facilities not meeting the 
target of male involvement in antenatal care). As the quote 
below illustrates, local disease patterns, related to the malaria 
season, and to periods with diarrhoeal diseases outbreaks 
and high incidence of acute respiratory infections, played a 
significant role in influencing utilization and quality of care. 
“Starting from December to May that’s the rainy season 
and we are very busy because that is the malaria season 
and we are treating a lot of malaria patients. In September 
and October there is an increase in diarrhoeal diseases and 
during May and June there are a lot of ARIs. Despite putting 
effort to clear the long queues sometimes we find it difficult 
to manage the work as we are few” [NIC].
The RBF approach in Zimbabwe had yet to factor in these 
local contextual factors in its incentive awarding arrangements; 
not doing so meant that some facilities (and the staff there) 
received (unfairly) lower incentive payments all the time, 
or during certain times, compared to some other facilities. 
These local and community level contextual influences, given 
that they were beyond the influence of the facility manager, 
constrained the ability of many managers to effectively lead 
their team and to keep them motivated to perform well. 
Geographical Context Hampering Achievements of Generic 
RBF Targets
In the same vein, generic RBF targets are/were set with the 
presumption that 60% of the population would utilize the 
health facility. However, facility location both positively and 
negatively affected the ability to reach set targets, for example 
through: (1) Being in a remote and sparsely populated area 
with target populations that faced access and transport 
challenges; (2) Being in proximity to referral facilities or 
to alternative facilities that offered more services or had 
more staff; or, (3) Being in proximity to a non-RBF district 
(increasing the number of clients in an RBF facility). When 
contextual factors beyond the clinic manager’s control, 
decreased the facilities earnings, the failure to reach targets 
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led to frustration amongst staff; it also undermined the 
credibility of the manager to lead, to foster teamwork and to 
maintain staff motivation.
Discussion 
Both, proponents and critics, have called for a more critical 
examination of the RBF approach.2,16-19 Fritsche et al,20 
consider the process of building the research evidence on 
results and performance-based financing arrangements, to be 
‘work in progress’; they have called upon researchers to use 
a variety of methodologies to examine RBF implementation. 
Our study contributes to this scientific exercise at 2 levels: 
through exploring an operational dilemma in the specific 
context of RBF implementation in Zimbabwe, and through 
using the insights gained from the study to shed light upon 
how operational issues and management arrangements on the 
ground, shape health policy implementation. 
The Dilemma of Fall in Motivation
At the heart of the RBF arrangements is the assumption 
that it brings about conditions which motivate health 
workers to perform and to deliver results.10,20 Fritsche et al20 
in their performance-based financing toolkit, explain that 
the regular ‘salary system provides fairly little additional 
financial motivation to provide services compared to other 
remuneration schemes’ (p 136), and that RBF introduces strong 
financial motivations, while still ‘relying on health workers’ 
internal motivation’ (p 53). The fall in motivation, in spite 
of substantial financial incentives (at individual and facility 
levels), and in spite of having greater autonomy to allocate 
facility level resources, was counterintuitive and problematic 
from a policy implementation perspective. This fall was 
all the more significant given that at baseline, motivation 
across all 8 constructs was higher in the RBF areas. Recent 
work by Lohmann et al21 suggests that RBF arrangements 
can positively influence health worker’s motivation in a 
variety of ways, but that implementation-related challenges 
and contextual factors, often existing health system issues, 
constrain the achievement of full motivating potential. 
Consistent with Lohmann et al,21 facility staff in our study 
also reported that the resources, autonomy and incentives 
from RBF spurred them to work harder to achieve targets. 
It was clear that contextual factors, primarily pre-existing 
health system issues, negated the motivational effects of RBF. 
Further, across all 8 constructs, at endline, motivation in the 
RBF areas had fallen lower than in the control areas, with the 
most significant falls in the ‘leadership’ and ‘teamwork’ related 
constructs. Our study showed that the capability of managers 
to exercise leadership and foster teamwork was hampered by 
the health system context, the influence of local politics on 
the health system, by individual management capacities as 
well as by the inability of the RBF design to align with the 
local geographical setting. This suggests that pre-existing 
management and institutional issues do not merely negate the 
motivating influence of RBF, unless systematically addressed, 
they have the potential to undermine the motivation of some 
frontline staff. 
Our findings signal that if the potential of achieving newly 
introduced rewards is frustrated by structural constraints, 
the loss of the reward that could have been had, amplifies 
the sense of powerlessness and frustration amongst agents, 
and undermines their intrinsic motivation. If the loss of the 
possible reward occurs despite the agents working hard, 
and if the agents can see that the loss was due to structural 
constraints and management capabilities, both beyond their 
sphere of influence, motivation can fall to levels even lower 
than before the rewards were introduced. 
The Centrality of Contextualising Health Policy Interventions
Recent reviews of literature on performance-based financing 
arrangements in low and middle-income countries have 
emphatically highlighted the importance of context to the 
implementation of RBF programs.2,18,22 Renmans et al18 have 
also argued for the need for operational research to identify 
these contextual influences, with a view to tailor RBF programs 
to different contexts. Our findings re-affirm the importance of 
contextualising the introduction and implementation of RBF 
and other such health policy interventions and provide insights 
for contextualisation of the RBF program in Zimbabwe. 
Our findings reiterate many of the points made by earlier 
empirical studies from other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
example, Ssengooba et al,16 Paul et al,23 and Sieleunou et al5 
have emphasised that the quality, structure and capacities of 
health systems where RBF programs are introduced, the local 
macro and micro politics, and, different and changing health 
priorities, affect the implementation of RBF programmes. To 
us, these commonalities signal an overarching theme which 
transcends contexts – that the success of health policy reforms 
is contingent upon the capacity of a health system to absorb 
these reforms. 
Acknowledging these commonalities, in the following sub-
sections we discuss our findings to extend the knowledge 
base on 2 linked fronts. We discuss how operational issues 
and management arrangements on the ground, shape health 
policy implementation. We make a case for health policy 
reforms to be grounded in and informed by a thorough 
analysis of whether the proposed changes can be absorbed by 
the health system; we discuss the importance of a deliberate 
and comprehensive institutional change management process 
to precede and accompany any health reform process. This 
discussion in many ways echoes and extends what Bhatnagar 
and George24 found in the context of introduction of RBF in 
Nigeria; that the scope of RBF alone “may not be sufficient to 
solve outstanding structural constraints, and (it) needs to be 
aligned with other health systems reforms to improve health 
worker motivation and performance.”
Reflections on the Process of Reallocation of Decision Space
At the heart of the RBF enterprise is the notion of devolution 
of authority to primary and secondary level facilities. Under 
RBF, facilities have the autonomy to use the funds they 
generate to tackle the priorities they identify. The premise 
of the RBF arrangement is that a combination of monetary 
rewards, at individual level and collectively at facility level, 
based on results, together with the autonomy to use these 
funds for improving service delivery, leads to health workers 
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being motivated to perform and to deliver. Our findings show 
that the ability of facility managers and staff to fulfil the above 
is constrained by how the process of reallocation of decision 
space, as Bossert25 calls it, is being operationalised. Based on 
our findings, these constraints operate at 2 levels: On one level, 
health facility managers and facility staff have been socialised 
in a system (training and professional system) which was 
input based and hierarchical, and with very little decision 
space at the facility level; they also continue to be situated in a 
system that for many parts remains as such. This socialisation 
and institutional context places limits on the ability of many 
facility managers and staff to imagine themselves exercising 
discretion and availing themselves to the newfound decision 
space. At another level, higher level managers have for decades 
also been socialised in a system (training and professional 
system) which was hierarchical, and where very little decision 
space was accorded to lower levels – our findings show that 
higher level managers also, and often with valid accountability 
related reasons, struggle to let go and cede decision space 
to lower levels. Our findings mirror Spisak and colleagues’4 
conclusion that RBF design should be an iterative process with 
careful and deliberate consultation with the actors involved 
in the management and implementation of RBF. We extend 
their insight by highlighting that the process of reallocation 
of decision space across actors is a delicate enterprise. 
We contend that it requires patient and diligent action to 
flexibly and if necessary, iteratively transfer authority, and it 
simultaneously requires building capacities of those to whom 
authority is being transferred, to be thoroughly prepared to 
absorb the additional decision space.26 Our study signals that 
more effort is required on this front to ensure smooth roll out 
of the RBF arrangements in Zimbabwe, and that it needs to 
be explicitly addressed wherever RBF arrangements are being 
similarly implemented.
Managing Change: Need to Identify Capacity Gaps and to 
Address These
RBF introduces a wide range of new institutional arrangements, 
new roles, new tasks, and new ways of doing things, for facility 
managers and district and provincial health management 
teams.27 Our findings expose how insufficient preparedness 
of people and processes for this change, undermines their 
ability to perform. Facility managers in the RBF scheme of 
things, unlike in input-based financing arrangements of 
the yore, are required to exercise much more discretion 
and leadership to achieve results, which, have tangible 
consequences for themselves and for their facility staff. That 
facility managers (in our study) had a dual role: as service 
providers and facility managers, further complicated matters. 
Without coaching and mentoring on how to play this dual 
role, these facility managers are unlikely to be able to navigate 
this dual role successfully, and they will continue to struggle 
to implement the RBF program, particularly the aspects that 
require innovation, exercise of autonomy and team-based 
decision making. It follows that higher-level managers - 
DMOs and provincial directors, need to have the capacity to 
coach and mentor facility manager – something that perhaps 
has not received the attention it deserves in Zimbabwe, yet. 
Qualitative studies done in Nigeria,24 Mozambique,4,6 and 
Cameroon5 affirm these reflections.
Our findings add that for RBF arrangements to work, these 
gaps need to be explicitly addressed, both at pre-service and 
in-service level. Based on our findings, we contend that the 
struggles of managers at the facility, district and provincial 
levels can be attributed to the absence of required leadership 
and management competencies: Cognitive intelligence, social 
intelligence and emotional intelligence,28 on one hand, and 
financial management competencies on the other. Asiri et 
al,13 Okello and Gilson,29 and Fritzen et al,30 have highlighted 
the importance of the role of managers in shaping the 
motivation and performance of the staff they manage. Fritzen 
et al30 add that managers can act to fulfil their management 
function provided they have the leadership and management 
competencies, decision-making space and tools and support 
from higher ups, to do so. Our study findings are consistent 
with this body of literature; study participants, both facility 
managers and staff, recognise gaps in their capacities to absorb 
the new roles and responsibilities, and its consequences. This 
is a systemic problem and strengthening health system wide 
human resource management capacities is thus clearly an 
area which deserves greater attention – it has the potential 
to substantially improve the RBF program performance 
in Zimbabwe; this insight is also relevant to other contexts 
which are considering implementing RBF arrangements. 
Managing Change: Putting, Explicit Change Management 
Processes in Place, Is Critical
Evidence also shows that mere capacity development at 
different levels is not enough; for such system wide reform, as 
RBF arguably is, to be effected, explicit organisational change 
management processes need to be put in place, across the 
system. Carefully designed processes, which take into account 
the interest and willingness of various actors to change,28 
and which are aware of and constructively engage with 
potential bottlenecks and points of resistance, are required to 
accompany the changes in institutional arrangements. Having 
such change management processes in place will support 
managers and health workers in better understanding their 
new roles and responsibilities and will allow policy-makers 
and managers to better deal with resistance to change. While 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to dwell into this, several 
models are available to guide change processes; they have 
been extensively documented in the context of the broader 
literature on organisational change.31-33 
 
Issues Deserving Further Work: An Agenda for Research
Recent reviews and qualitative studies on the implementation 
of performance-based financing arrangements, have identified 
a range of questions that deserve the attention of researchers. 
Renmans et al,18 have made the case for researchers to 
examine RBF interventions as complex interventions being 
introduced in complex and open health system. Witter et al34 
argue that policy-makers and researchers need to critically 
examine “dynamic linkages between context, process of 
development, design, implementation and effects and 
between different health system pillars.” Grittner8 and Gautier 
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et al’s1 reviews, and Sieleunou et al’s5 policy analysis illustrate 
the importance of a careful assessment of the historical and 
relational contexts; their work shows the importance of 
gaining insight into the power dynamics, and the related 
forms of influence (financial, relational, ideational, network 
and knowledge based) when examining policy reforms. This 
study extends this research agenda on RBF arrangements, 
and on health policy implementation broadly, by highlighting 
some important research questions about management 
arrangements around policy implementation. 
For example, health facility managers clearly struggled 
with their dual roles – of being a provider, and member of 
a small team working towards common rewards on one 
hand, and on the other, being the arbiter, whose decisions 
have clear and often immediate monetary consequences 
for other team members. While there is rich literature in 
management studies on the travails of the middle manager, 
little research has been done from which planners and policy-
makers could draw insight to construct human resource 
management arrangements to allow managers in such 
situations to optimally play this dual role. There is also little 
research on the ways and means for programs and for lower 
level managers to approach and navigate community level, 
local politics – while striking a balance between competing 
accountability expectations. While there is some literature, 
particularly in relation to health system decentralisation, on 
considerations and strategies for transferring decision spaces 
to lower levels, there is little work on doing so in the context 
of RBF where the prospects of monetary gains/losses are an 
important additional factor to reckon with, both in terms of 
individual incentives as well as collective financial resources 
to improve service performance and to reach public health 
targets. It is likely that managers in the context of faith-based 
facilities (a substantial number in Zimbabwe, and Africa at 
large) and secondary and tertiary level facilities will have 
different experiences – as the organisational cultures in 
these settings are likely to be different; there is little insight 
yet on this subject. Gaining answers to these questions can, 
not merely help improve the RBF program implementation 
in Zimbabwe, the insight can also inform improvements in 
implementation in other settings. 
Limitations: On the Construct Well Being
Findings from the impact evaluation study by Nguyen 
et al7 which showed that health workers under the RBF 
arrangements showed statistically significant reduction 
across 3 aspects ‘Leadership,’ ‘Teamwork,’ and ‘Well Being’ 
were the trigger for this study. In the process of designing 
this study, and while testing the interview topic guides, we 
struggled with the notion of appropriately including lines of 
inquiry about ‘Well Being.’ We were faced with 2 major issues. 
One, the lines of inquiry which constituted the construct of 
well-being in Nguyen et al’s survey7 were deemed by study 
participants to be social experiences that were shaped less 
by the work environment, let alone one program, but largely 
by one’s private and social situation; participants further felt 
that these aspects were beyond the sphere of influence of the 
facility managers. Secondly, and in line with the views of the 
participants, and in discussions within the research team, it 
was realised that ‘Well Being’ was not at the same level as the 
other 7 constructs, and that well-being was perhaps better 
understood as the consequence of many, if not all the other 
constructs included in the survey. It is possible that the notion 
of well-being, as defined in the literature, is not a sufficiently 
valid construct when researching health worker motivation 
in the context of RBF in the Zimbabwean health system; it 
is however also possible, that we fell short with our lines of 
inquiry in eliciting it as such. 
Conclusion
This study clearly shows the importance of recognising 
RBF as a policy intervention being introduced in a complex 
environment with pre-existing dynamics. It is critical that 
those contemplating the introduction or scale up of RBF 
arrangements, or for that matter any complex health system 
reform, recognise that the process entails inserting complex 
relational dynamics within the larger health system; many 
of which are potentially disruptive of the status quo. This 
study illustrates the importance of thoroughly studying these 
relational dynamics, before, during a trial implementation 
phase, and on an ongoing basis. We argue that such a critical 
and reflective approach will allow funders and countries: to 
make a measured and realistic judgment about the feasibility 
of introduction and/or further scale up of RBF arrangements, 
and, where applicable, concomitant development of 
management processes to effectively absorb changes.
By carefully examining the effect of RBF arrangements on 
health worker motivation, this study shows that the implicit 
assumption of RBF-interventions that new institutional, 
financial and governance arrangements will ‘automatically’ 
improve leadership and teamwork to achieve motivation to 
perform better, cannot hold. It demonstrates the importance 
of analysing existing arrangements and capabilities and taking 
these into account when designing and implementing RBF 
interventions. We argue that RBF arrangements, by giving 
incentives, providing autonomy, and adapting management 
arrangements, cannot overcome chronic systemic weaknesses, 
on their own. A fall in motivation is but a prelude to a fall 
in performance; if system level problems and deficits are not 
addressed, the gains made thus far might not be maintained. 
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